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Abstract
We consider interregional migration, where regions may be interpreted as clubs, social
subgroups, species, or strategies. Using the positive deﬁnite adaptive (PDA) dynamics,
which include the replicator dynamics, we examine the evolutionary stable state (ESS) and
the asymptotic stability of the spatial distribution of economic activities in a multiregional
system. We derive an exact condition for the equivalence between ESS and asymptotically
stable equilibrium in each PDA dynamic. We show that market outcome yields the eﬃcient
allocation of population with an additional condition. We also show that interior equilibria
are stable in the presence of strong congestion diseconomies but unstable in the presence of
strong agglomeration economies with a further condition.
Keywords: asymptotic stability, ESS, positive deﬁnite adaptive dynamics, replicator dy-
namics, economic geography.
J.E.L. Classiﬁcation: C62, C73, R23.
1 Introduction
General equilibrium analysis in international economics or in economic geography has usually
dealt with two regions only. It is often said that analyzing more than two regions is no eas-
ier than analyzing the universal gravitation among more than two particles in physics. General
equilibrium analysis of multiregional dynamical systems is very complicated since we must simul-
taneously consider not only prices and quantities in all regions but also interregional migration
of ﬁrms and households.
In this paper, assuming that all economic variables constituting utility functions are ex-
pressed by the spatial distribution of population as reduced forms, we pay attention to spatial
equilibrium and the optimum population distribution. It is important to know if there exists a
spatial equilibrium such that no economic agent has an incentive to migrate in a multiregional
system. It is also important to know whether or not these equilibria are stable against any
perturbations. However, Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), Fujita and Thisse (2001), Otta-
viano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2001) and Tabuchi, Thisse and Zeng (2001) among others, analyze
spatial equilibria in multiregional systems without fully examining the existence and stability of
these equilibria.
Concerning the existence of equilibrium, Miyao (1978) showed that a spatial equilibrium
in a dynamical system exists when migration is probabilistic for any continuous probability
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1function, any continuous utility function, and any number of regions. Ginsburgh, Papageorgiou
and Thisse (1985) have shown the existence of spatial equilibrium for a dynamical system when
migration is determined by interregional utility diﬀerentials with any continuous utility function
and for any number of regions.
However, very little is known concerning the stability of spatial equilibrium except for the fact
that the number of regions is two. Miyao (1978) and Ginsburgh et al. (1985) analyze stability
conditions in a multiregional system using probabilistic models. Although they provide some
suﬃcient conditions for stability, these conditions seem to be far from necessary for stability.
Using a deterministic model of a multiregional system, Tabuchi (1986) obtained instability
conditions of interior equilibrium, while Zeng (2001) derived stability conditions of interior and
corner equilibria. In both cases, however, they use a speciﬁc dynamic.
In this paper, we establish stability and instability conditions of spatial equilibrium in positive
deﬁnite adaptive (PDA) dynamics including the replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978).
We would like to emphasize that the model of our paper is general enough in three respects.
First, although we deal with regions, they may be interpreted as various social subgroups – for
example, clubs in local public ﬁnance and strategies in population games. Second, our results
are for any number of regions, whereas almost all results in the previous literature are limited
to two regions. Finally, our dynamics is not conﬁned to a simple economic model of utility
diﬀerentials. It includes not only the gravity models in international and regional economics,
but also the replicator dynamics in biology and game theory as special cases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Spatial equilibrium and its asymptotic
stability are deﬁned formally in Sections 2. We use PDA dynamics to describe migration behavior
in Section 3. Section 4 deﬁnes ESS and asymptotic stability in PDA dynamics and clariﬁes
their mathematical relationship. Based on this, we establish a theorem on the equivalence
of asymptotic stability and ESS conditions under somewhat general conditions on the utility
functions in Section 5. We ﬁnd that the market outcome and the social optimum of population
distribution coincide by imposing the symmetric condition on the utility functions in Section
6. We then identify conditions that generate market distortion. In Section 7, we derive the
simple stability and instability conditions of interior equilibrium with a further assumption on
the utility functions. It is clariﬁed that the system tends to be stable (unstable) in the presence
of negative (positive) externalities. Section 8 concludes.
2 Spatial equilibrium
The space-economy is made of n ≥ 2 regions. The total population is ﬁxed and normalized to
1. Let xi ∈ [0,1] denote the population share in region i =1 ,...,nand let
X ≡
 
x =( x1,...,x n) ;
n  
i=1
xi = 1 and xi ≥ 0
 
.
Markets are monopolistically competitive as in Fujita et al. (1999) or markets are competitive
with Marshallian externalities as in Henderson (1974). Each ﬁrm produces a diﬀerentiated
product in a region. Each ﬁrm selects a price so as to maximize its proﬁt in monopolistically
competitive markets with free entry and free migration of ﬁrms. Each homogeneous household
consumes a variety of diﬀerentiated products so as to maximize its utility under an income
constraint. In addition, each household chooses a region with the highest utility under free
interregional migration. Suppose that all prices and quantities are uniquely determined by
solving a set of the ﬁrst-order conditions for maximum, together with the zero proﬁt condition
2and the free migration condition. Then, we would be able to express the indirect utility in each
region as a function of population distribution in a general equilibrium context.1
Let ui(x) be the (indirect) utility level residing in region i =1 ,...,n, where ui(x) satisﬁes
the so-called Lipschitz condition and is hence continuous in x. Assuming a zero cost of migration,
each household freely migrates between regions so as to maximize its utility, resulting in an equal
utility level u∗. The distribution x∗ ∈ X is a spatial equilibrium when no individual can receive a
higher utility level by migrating to another region. Formally, a distribution x∗ is an equilibrium
if u∗ exists such that
ui(x∗)=u∗ if x∗
i > 0,
ui(x∗) ≤ u∗ if x∗
i =0 .
The equality means that the utility level is constant across regions with positive population. On
the other hand, the inequality implies that some regions may have zero population in equilibrium
with lower utility levels than other regions. Because ui(x) is continuous, we know that a spatial
equilibrium always exists from Proposition 1 of Ginsburgh et al. (1985).
3 Dynamics for migration
Consider an interior equilibrium x∗ =( x∗
1,...,x ∗
n)  with x∗
i > 0 for each region i so that we can
limit our concern to a neighborhood of x∗. The population (share) migrating from the origin
region j to the destination region i( = j) during the unit time period is
·
xji = Mji(x,u i(x) − uj(x))
= fij(x)[ui(x) − uj(x)] for i,j ∈{ 1,...,n}, (1)




by Taylor’s expansion with respect to ui − uj.2 By deﬁnition of xji, the symmetry fij = fji
holds for all i,j =1 ,...,n. For convenience, we set fii = 0 for all i.













(uik − ujk)xk (2)
1See Krugman (1993) and Fujita, Krugman and Mori (1999) inter alia for more detailed economic descriptions
of ﬁrm and household behaviors.
2Note that fij is related to the attributes of the distribution
x and origin-destination relationships, such as






where dij is the distance between regions i and j and κ is a positive constant. The term xi is interpreted as the
supply of migrants in the origin region, and the term xj is the demand for migrants, such as job opportunities in the
destination region. This gravity model is widely used in empirical analyses of migration and international trade—
for example, Greenwood (1975) and Bergstrand (1985, 1989)—and there are some microeconomic foundations in





By Taylor’s expansion again, the system (2) is linearized in the neighborhood of x = x∗ as
·







f1 −f12 ··· −f1n















u11 u12 ··· u1n












j =ifij for i =1 ,...,n. In evolutionary game theory, ui(x) is interpreted as absolute
ﬁtness, and (F(x)U(x)x)i is relative ﬁtness.
Following Hopkins and Seymour (2000), we call (3) a positive deﬁnite adaptive (PDA) dy-
namic3 if the following conditions additionally hold.
(i) Every element of F is continuously diﬀerentiable in x. (4)
(ii) y Fy > 0 for all y ∈ Rn which is not a multiple of 1 =( 1 ,...,1) . (5)
Together with the Lipschitz condition on ui(x), condition (4) ensures a unique solution for
each PDA dynamic.
The class of PDA dynamics is large enough to allow fij ≤ 0 for several i and j.I ffij > 0 for
all i  = j, then it is consistent with a well-established tradition in migration theory (Greenwood,
1975): people migrate from low- to high-utility regions from (1). If we specify fij = κxixj for
all i,j, then the PDA dynamics (3) turn out to be the replicator dynamics:
·
xi = κxi [ui(x) −
 
j
xjuj(x)] for i =1 ,...,n.
If we set fij = κ/n, then (3) is reduced to the simple dynamics (Tabuchi, 1986; Friedman, 1991;
Zeng, 2001):
·





uj(x)] for i =1 ,...,n.
4 Asymptotic stability and evolutionarily stable state
A spatial equilibrium x∗ is asymptotically stable if, for any positive  , there exists a neighborhood
N(x∗)o fx∗ such that for any x0 ∈ N(x∗), the solution x(t)=( x1(t),...,x n(t))  of a given
dynamical system with an initial value x0(0) = x0 satisﬁes ||x(t) − x∗||(≡ maxi=1,...,n |xi(t) −
x∗
i|) < for any time t ≥ 0 and limt→∞ x(t)=x∗. It is known that equilibrium x∗ of (3) is
asymptotically stable if all the real parts of eigenvalues of F(x∗)U(x∗) are negative.
3Hofbauer and Sigmund (1990, 1998) call such a dynamic simply adaptive dynamic. This dynamic is weak
compatible with a ﬁtness function ui(
x) (Friedman, 1991).
4On the other hand, a spatial equilibrium x∗ is an evolutionarily stable state (ESS) if for
every perturbation (strategy) x =x∗,
n  
i=1




iui((1 −  )x∗ +  x) (6)
holds for any suﬃciently small  >0.4 Linearizing ui(·) in the neighborhood of  , (6) is approx-
imated as
(x − x∗) U(x − x∗) < 0. (7)















j)(uij + uji) − λi = 0 for i =1 ,...,n,





   







   
   







ui1i1 ui1i2 ··· ui1im











Note that −UE[1···m] is the sum of all the cofactors of [U({1···m})+U({1···m}) ]/2. If the
inequalities in (9) hold strictly, then x∗ becomes an ESS. For later purposes, we deﬁne
UA[1···m] ≡
 





   
 ,
which is the sum of all the cofactors of U({1···m}).
The following lemma illuminates the important relationship between the ESS property and
the asymptotic stability. Although this result is partly obtained by Samuelson (1947), Hines
(1980) ﬁrst derives the following lemma with respect to Rn, and Hopkins (1999) with respect to
Rn
0 = {(z1,...,z n) |
 n
i=1 zi =0 }.
4An ESS is called regular if all strategies that are a best reply to
x
∗ are in its support. Following most of the
literature, we only consider a regular ESS in this paper.
5Lemma 1 The following two statements are equivalent;
(i) Matrix U + U  is negative deﬁnite when constrained to Rn
0;
(ii) For any matrix F which is positive deﬁnite when constrained to Rn
0, the eigenvalues of
FU for all eigenvectors in Rn
0 have negative real parts.
Proposition 1 Suppose UE[i1 ···im]  =0for any m ≥ 2, then an equilibrium is ESS if and only
if it is asymptotically stable for any PDA dynamic.
Hopkins (1999) gives a proof for the only if part of Proposition 1.5 The if part holds
evidently.
Proposition 1 shows that the ESS is equivalent to the asymptotic stability of the whole
class of PDA dynamics. When x∗ is asymptotically stable for several PDA dynamics, it is not
necessarily ESS. However, we will show that this is true under a certain condition in the next
section.
5 Equivalence between asymptotic stability and ESS
We show in this section that the converse of Proposition 1 becomes true when one of the
conditions in Lemma 2 holds. That is, the asymptotic stability conditions for any PDA dynamic
coincide with the ESS conditions: if x∗ is asymptotically stable in a PDA dynamic, then it is
ESS, and vice versa. For this purpose, we begin with lemmas.
Lemma 2 For n ≥ 3, the following four statements are equivalent:
(i) For any m ∈{ 3,...,n} and i1,...,i m ∈{ 1,...,n}, UA[i1 ···im]=UE[i1 ···im] holds.
(ii) For any distinct i,j,k ∈{ 1,...,n}, UA[ijk]=UE[ijk] holds.
(iii) For any distinct i,j,k ∈{ 1,...,n}, it holds that
uij + ujk + uki = uik + ukj + uji. (10)
(iv) There exists a =( a1,...,a n)  ∈ Rn such that uij − uji = aj − ai for all i,j =1 ,...,n.
A proof is in the Appendix. Lemma 2 gives exact conditions for the equivalence between the
asymptotic stability and the ESS property shown in Theorem 1 below.
Lemma 3 Suppose UE[i1 ···im]  =0for any m ≥ 2, then for any symmetric U at spatial
equilibrium, the asymptotically stable equilibria are precisely the ESS in every PDA dynamic.
Proof. For any speciﬁc PDA dynamic, each ESS is asymptotically stable by Proposition 1.




















5The strict inequality condition of (9) is not clearly stated in Hopkins (1999). However, it is necessary because















=2 ( Ux) F(Ux)
≥ 0.
The third equality is because ui(x)=( Ux)i. The inequality is due to the deﬁnition of PDA
dynamics (5), with equality if and only if x is an interior equilibrium, so that ui(x)=uj(x) for
all i,j =1 ,...,n.
Let x∗ be any asymptotically stable equilibrium. Then, x Ux < x∗ Ux∗ holds for all x  = x∗
in the neighborhood of x∗. Replacing x by 2x − x∗ (which is also close to x∗), we obtain
x Ux < x∗ Ux, implying that x∗ is an ESS. 
Based on the lemmas, we then establish our main result.
Theorem 1 For any U satisfying condition (10) at spatial equilibrium, the asymptotically stable






First, we show that the asymptotic stability properties are the same between vi(x) and ui(x).
For any distinct i,j, we readily have













where the second equality in (12) is due to condition (iv) in Lemma 2. From (11), the solutions






j fij(x)[vi(x) − vj(x)]





j fij(x)[ui(x) − uj(x)]
xu(0) = x0 (14)
implying that the asymptotic stability properties are the same between them. Second, we know
from Lemma 3 that the asymptotically stable equilibria are precisely the ESS in (13) for any


























the ESS property for v(x) is identical to that for u(x).
7Finally, by these three equivalence, the ESS property for u(x) is shown to be the same as
the asymptotic stability for any u(x) satisfying condition (iv) in Lemma 2. 
It is known that asymptotically stable equilibria in replicator dynamics are precisely ESS
in doubly symmetric games (Losert and Akin, 1983). Theorem 1 is more general. The equiv-
alence property between asymptotic stability and ESS holds for each PDA dynamic and for
each symmetric game with a payoﬀ matrix U satisfying (10). Note that the class of PDA dy-
namics includes the replicator dynamics and the class of symmetric games with payoﬀ matrices
satisfying (10) includes doubly symmetric games.
It is also known that if U is negative deﬁnite, the equilibrium is asymptotically stable from
Proposition 1; and if U is positive deﬁnite, the equilibrium is unstable from Proposition 3 in
Hopkins and Seymour (2000). If U is neither negative nor positive deﬁnite, then the stability
depends on the dynamics F. However, the equilibrium turns out to be always unstable under
condition (10) when U is not negative deﬁnite by Theorem 1, which provides nearly unifying
conditions that are both suﬃcient and necessary.6 Hence, Taylor-Jonker’s (1978, p.151) example,
that the equilibrium is not ESS but asymptotically stable, never appears under condition (10).
In the context of economic geography, Theorem 1 is interpreted as follows. ESS is based
on “corporate rationality” in that a mutant entrepreneur maximizes the average utility level
of employees by employing a small number of them from various regions and relocating them
to several regions. That is, the entrepreneur optimizes the distribution of employees among
multilocational branch ﬁrms. On the other hand, asymptotic stability in PDA dynamics is
based on “individual rationality” in that each individual chooses a region so as to maximize her
utility level in the long run. Note that individuals do not always migrate from lower- to higher-
utility regions (i.e., fij > 0) in PDA dynamics. They may temporarily migrate from higher- to
lower-utility regions (i.e., fij < 0), but they migrate so that their utilities become the highest
in the long run. Under (10), the corporate behavior depicted by ESS is shown to coincide with
the individual behavior described by asymptotic stability in PDA dynamics.
Not surprisingly, Theorem 1 shows that the stability conditions are determined only by the
derivatives of the utilities uij’s but independent of the interaction terms fij’s for any PDA
dynamic. Such independence of fij is also found in computing the spatial equilibrium, which is
ui(x) =constant.
The assumption (10) is not so restrictive. From Lemma 2, (10) is the same as
uij = bi + bij with bij = bji ∀i,j =1 ,...,n.
Thus, Theorem 1 applies if the utility function is linearized as








in the neighborhood of equilibrium x∗ as in Tabuchi (1982). The ﬁrst term (¯ ui + ai) is the
exogenous net amenities in region i, while the second and the third terms are endogenously de-
termined net beneﬁts of intraregional and interregional market interactions. One may consider
the population ﬁctitious play in which one individual chooses region i and another individual
selects region j with probability xj. The second term is the case of i = j, where her payoﬀ bii
6The reason for “nearly” is that there remain the cases of UE[i1 ···im]=0( m ≥ 2) in (9). However, such
critical cases are indeterminate without information on the higher-order partial derivatives.
8represents the intraregional net beneﬁts or spatial externalities of agglomeration net beneﬁts.
The third term is the case of i  = j, where her payoﬀ bij expresses the interregional net beneﬁts,
which is assumed symmetric bij = bji. In reality, this assumption may be justiﬁed since inter-
regional transportation and communication beneﬁts and costs, such as telephone charges and
airfares, are symmetric. In this situation, the asymptotic stability is equivalent to the negative
deﬁniteness of U only.
6 Social optimum versus market equilibrium
Social optimum conﬁguration xo is deﬁned by the most eﬃcient allocation of population, which








As before, linearizing u(x) around xo yields the ﬁrst-order condition for optimum:
 
j
(uij + uji)xj = constant. (17)
On the other hand, the spatial equilibrium condition is ui(x)=u∗ or
 
j
uijxj = constant. (18)
If the symmetry condition uij = uji is met for all i and j, the necessary conditions for
optimum (17) and equilibrium (18) are equalized. Similar to the proof of Lemma 3, we have the
following.
Theorem 2 For any symmetric U at spatial equilibrium, the socially optimum allocation of
population is automatically attained by the market mechanism for any PDA dynamic if the
equilibrium is unique.
It is often the case that true migration behavior is impossible to observe, and hence exact
dynamics cannot be depicted. However, insofar as the dynamics are in the class of PDA dynam-
ics, the market equilibrium is shown to be equal to the socially optimum if the symmetry holds
near the equilibrium and the equilibrium is unique. In this situation, no market intervention is
necessary. In other words, the reasons to prevent equilibrium paths approaching social optimum
are the asymmetric marginal utilities and multiple equilibria.
It is worth noting that the intraregional externalities uii do not cause any market distortion
if the conditions in Theorem 2 are met. This seems inconsistent with the well-known result that
the market outcome with positive (negative) externalities uii > (<)0 involves too little (much)
agglomeration if we can change the number of regions n (Henderson, 1974; Kanemoto, 1980).
However, since n is ﬁxed here, such distortions do not occur. In fact, changing n is prohibitively
diﬃcult in practice since emergence and disappearance of cities are not realized by inﬁnitesimal
lows of migration.
Another important issue is the direction of market distortion. For n = 2 with linear utility






9if they are interior solutions. Since UA[12] > 0 holds for asymptotic stability and ESS, we can
say that region 1 is overpopulated (underpopulated) if u12 >u 21 (u12 <u 21), and is the socially
optimum size if u12 = u21. Unfortunately, such a result cannot be generalized for n ≥ 3 except
for the symmetric case (Theorem 2).
Finally, the social welfare function (16) resembles the objective function (8) in deriving the
ESS condition. However, the former does not have x∗
i and x∗
j, while the latter does. The social
planner maximizes the sum of all utilities (16) in optimum. In equilibrium, on the other hand,
each individual simply chooses a higher-utility region, or each multilocational ﬁrm allocates
employees in order to maximize their average utility level. Since each ﬁrm is small enough, it is
unable to maximize the sum of all utilities without the symmetry and uniqueness conditions.
7 Market interactions within regions
Due to the spatial proximity, the intraregional market interactions are usually much stronger
than the interregional market interactions. In order to crystallize the discussion, we consider
the special, but important, case of
ui(x)=ui(xi). (19)
Assumption (19) is justiﬁed when the impacts of own population are much stronger than those
of other populations, i.e., |uii| | uik| for all i  = k. For example, urban costs and beneﬁts such
as congestion and product variety are usually closely related to population size within a region
only but not to the populations of other regions. This implies that the change in population
share xi on the utility levels in other regions uj is zero for all j( = i).
Since assumption (19) implies the symmetry assumption uij = uji, Theorem 2 applies. That
is, insofar as the market equilibrium is unique, it is the socially optimum allocation of population
for any marginal utility uii and for any PDA dynamic.
Corollary 1 Suppose the intraregional market interactions uii are much larger than the inter-
regional ones uij (j  = i). Then, for any PDA dynamic, the socially optimum allocation of
population is automatically attained by the market mechanism if the equilibrium is unique.
Since assumption (19) also implies assumption (10), we know from Theorem 1 that the
ESS conditions coincide with the asymptotic stability conditions for any PDA dynamic. The
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for ESS are the negative deﬁniteness of UE, which are
(−1)iUE[1···i] > 0 for all i =2 ,...,n.
Without loss of generality, let
u11 ≥ u22 ≥···≥unn. (20)
We have the following nearly necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the stability of spatial
equilibrium under the assumption (19).
Proposition 2 Any PDA dynamic (3) is asymptotically stable and is ESS if (i) or (ii) holds.
(i) u11 ≤ 0 and u22 < 0,
(ii) u11 > 0 >u 22 and
 
i 1/uii > 0.
Any PDA dynamic (3) is neither asymptotically stable nor ESS if (iii) or (iv) holds.
(iii) u11 > 0 >u 22 and
 
i 1/uii < 0,
(iv) u11 > 0 and u22 ≥ 0.
10A proof is in the Appendix. As in Theorem 1, Proposition 2 provides nearly unifying condi-
tions that are both suﬃcient and necessary.
Stability condition (i) in Proposition 2 says that if an increasing population always lowers
its utility level and a decreasing population always raises its utility level, no individual has an
incentive to migrate, and hence it is stable. In other words, congestion diseconomies within all
regions ensure the stability of interior equilibrium.
On the other hand, instability condition (iv) says that if a small migration between positively
sloped regions takes place due to a disturbance, then it is unstable. Since the utility level
increases in the region experiencing in-migration while it decreases in a region experiencing out-
migration, it generates further migration between the regions, leading to instability.7 That is,
the existence of suﬃciently large agglomeration economies within at least two regions destroys
the stability of interior equilibrium.
If there is only one positive slope of the utility function, conditions (ii) and (iii) apply. For
n = 2, suppose a small (net) migration were to occur from region 2 with u22 < 0 to region 1
with u11 > 0, then the utility levels in both regions would increase. If u−1
11 + u−1














and hence the increase in region 2’s utility is higher. This necessarily generates the reverse
migration from region 1 to region 2, restoring the original equilibrium x∗. On the other hand,
if u−1
11 + u−1




















Figure 1: Stability in a multiregional system
A similar principle holds for n ≥ 3. Suppose a small (net) migration from regions i =2 ,...,n




∆xi > 0. (22)
7It should be mentioned that Konishi, Le Breton and Weber (1997a) showed the existence of strong Nash
equilibrium related to (i) in Proposition 2 in the presence of negative externality called “partial rivalry,” and
Konishi, Le Breton and Weber (1997b) showed the nonexistence of equilibrium related to (iv) in Proposition 2 in
the presence of positive externality.
11The change in the utility level in each region is illustrated in the diagram of Figure 1. Now,




















If each ∆ui were to be the same for all i =2 ,...,nas in Figure 1, then (23) would be reduced
to (21). Since the utility increase in region 1 is smaller than that in other regions (∆u1 < ∆ui),
the stability of the multiregional system is guaranteed.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the spatial distribution of economic activities in a multiregional
dynamical system assuming that other variables, such as prices and quantities, are solved as a
function of the distribution in general equilibrium.
With regular conditions on utility functions (uij+ujk+uki = uik+ukj+uji), we have proven
that asymptotic stability conditions and ESS conditions coincide in any PDA dynamic. In this
case, the stability of spatial equilibrium is ensured only by computing the signs of the principal
minors of the payoﬀ matrix U, without computing all the eigenvalues of the dynamical system
FU (Theorem 1).
Imposing the symmetric assumption on the marginal utility functions (uij = uji), we have
shown that the market outcome of population distribution (equilibrium conﬁguration) coincides
with globally eﬃcient allocation of population (social optimum conﬁguration) (Theorem 2).
Imposing a further assumption of negligible interregional externalities (uij =0 ,∀i  = j), we
have derived simple stability conditions of spatial interior equilibrium (Proposition 2). Due to
the simple form of the conditions, we were able to interpret them and explain how the multire-
gional system becomes stable in several ways. We have shown that strong positive externalities
due to agglomeration economies destroy the interior equilibrium of the system whereas strong
negative externalities due to agglomeration diseconomies, such as congestion, stabilize the inte-
rior equilibrium.
So far we have obtained the stability conditions of spatial equilibrium, and Ginsburgh et
al. (1985) showed the existence of spatial equilibrium. However, not everything has been
elucidated on the nature of spatial equilibrium. In particular, there is no guarantee that a
spatial stable equilibrium always exists, although its existence seems quite likely. In fact, our
preliminary analysis indicates that the spatial stable equilibrium always exists under a class of
utility functions.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
(i)⇒(ii). This is simply because (ii) is a special case of (i).
(ii)⇒(iii). Obviously,
0=UA[ijk] − UE[ijk]=( uij + ujk + uki − uji − ukj − uik)2,
holds for any diﬀerent combination of i,j,k =1 ,...,n.
12(iii)⇒(iv). Let
aj = u1j − uj1,i , j =1 ,...,n.
Then,
aj − ai = u1j + ui1 − u1i − uj1 = uj1 + u1i + uij − uji − u1i − uj1 = uij − uji.
(iv)⇒(i). We only prove that UE[1···i]=UA[1···i] holds for i =3 ,...,n below. Other
cases can be proven by suitably renumbering the regions.
UE[1···i]=
 
   
 
   
   
   
 
01 1··· 1
1 u11 (u12 + u21)/2 ··· (u1i + ui1)/2






1( u1i + ui1)/2( u2i + ui2)/2 ··· uii
 
   
 
   
   
   
 
=
   
 
   
   
   
   
01 1··· 1
1 u11 u12 − (a1 − a2)/2 ··· u1i − (a1 − ai)/2






1 ui1 +( a1 − ai)/2 ui2 +( a2 − ai)/2 ··· uii
   
 
   
   
   




   
   
   
   
 
01 1··· 1
1 u11 + a1/2 u12 + a2/2 ··· u1i + ai/2






1 ui1 + a1/2 ui2 + a2/2 ··· uii + ai/2
 
 
   
   
   




   
   
   




1 u11 u12 ··· u1i






1 ui1 ui2 ··· uii
 
   
   
   





Proof of Proposition 2
Since the asymptotic stability conditions for any F and the ESS conditions coincide under
assumption (19) by Theorem 1, it is suﬃcient to check the condition (9). From (20), the LHS
of (9) is rewritten as
(−1)mUE[1···m]=

      
      



















which satisﬁes (9) with strict inequality.





j=1 1/ujj < 0, this violates condition (9) for
m = n.
(iv) Since (−1)2UE[12] = −u11 − u22 < 0, this violates (9) for m =2 . 
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